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On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Western District of Pennsylvania 
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(Filed: August 14, 2020) 
 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Shawn McElroy (“McElroy”) fell while working at a power plant operated by 
FirstEnergy Generation, LLC (“FirstEnergy Generation”).  McElroy seeks to recover for 
negligence and loss of consortium.  But rather than sue FirstEnergy Generation, McElroy 
instead sues FirstEnergy Generation’s parent company, FirstEnergy Corporation, and 
seeks to impose liability on FirstEnergy Corporation by piercing FirstEnergy 
Generation’s corporate veil.  The District Court ruled that McElroy could not pierce the 
corporate veil and, because McElroy had not asserted any viable claim against 
FirstEnergy Corporation directly, he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted.  Accordingly, the District Court dismissed his complaint.  For substantially 
the same reasons stated in the District Court’s thorough opinion, we will affirm. 
I1 
While working for Securitas Services USA, Inc. at the Beaver Valley Generation 
Power Plant (“BVNPP”), McElroy fell on a set of stairs and injured his ankle.   
BVNPP is operated by FirstEnergy Generation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
FirstEnergy Corporation.  FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (“FirstEnergy 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the procedural 
posture to date, we only include what is necessary to explain our decision. 
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Nuclear”), another wholly owned subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corporation, had received 
five notifications that the stairs were deteriorated and dangerous. 
To recover for McElroy’s injuries, McElroy and his wife, Amber McElroy 
(referred to in this opinion together as “McElroy”), sued FirstEnergy Corporation in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania.  The case was then removed to 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  McElroy’s 
complaint asserts three causes of action: a claim for negligence; a claim for loss of 
consortium; and a claim for “Piercing the Corporate Veil/Alter Ego,” in which McElroy 
alleges that FirstEnergy Corporation, FirstEnergy Generation, and FirstEnergy Nuclear 
are liable for McElroy’s injuries because FirstEnergy Generation and other corporate 
entities are sham corporations created for the purpose of defrauding and injuring entities 
and persons, including him.  FirstEnergy Generation, the owner and operator of the 
power plant where McElroy was injured, and FirstEnergy Nuclear were in bankruptcy 
when McElroy sued, and McElroy missed the deadline to submit his claim in Bankruptcy 
Court. 
FirstEnergy Corporation moved to dismiss McElroy’s complaint and the District 
Court granted FirstEnergy Corporation’s motion.  The District Court ruled that 
Pennsylvania choice of law principles dictate that Ohio law governs whether McElroy 
may pierce FirstEnergy Generation’s corporate veil to reach FirstEnergy Corporation.  It 
then ruled that McElroy had not satisfied Ohio’s requirements for veil piercing, and 
dismissed his complaint because he had not pleaded any independent basis of liability on 
4 
the part of FirstEnergy, and therefore, without veil-piercing, had failed to state a claim for 
relief. 
II2 
We review the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint de novo.  See City 
of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We review de 
novo the District Court’s decision to grant [a] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”); 
Robeson Indus. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 178 F.3d 160, 164-65 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“Choice-of-law is a question of law which [we] review de novo.”). 
III 
The District Court properly dismissed McElroy’s complaint.  First, the District 
Court correctly ruled that Ohio law governs whether McElroy may pierce the corporate 
veil.  Under Pennsylvania choice of law principles,3 a court must look to the law of the 
state in which an entity is incorporated to determine whether a plaintiff may pierce that 
entity’s corporate veil.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, 
158 A.3d 203, 236 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (holding that because, “[u]nder Pennsylvania 
law, the existence and extent of shareholder liability . . . is determined by the law of the 
state of incorporation,” the law of the state of incorporation also governs whether a 
corporation is subject to veil-piercing (citing Broderick v. Stephano, 171 A. 582 (Pa. 
 
2 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law principles of the state in 
which in which the District Court sits.  See, e.g., Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 
435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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1934))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Commonwealth by 
Shapiro v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 2018).  Because 
FirstEnergy Generation and FirstEnergy Nuclear—the entities whose corporate veils 
McElroy seeks to pierce—are undisputedly incorporated in Ohio, the District Court 
correctly ruled that Ohio law governs the issue of whether McElroy may pierce the 
corporate veil. 
Second, the District Court also correctly ruled that McElroy is not entitled to 
pierce the corporate veil under Ohio law.  The leading Ohio case on this point, 
Dombroski v. WellPoint, Incorporated, requires a plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate 
veil to show: 
(1) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was so complete 
that the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own, 
(2) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in 
such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking 
to disregard the corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the 
plaintiff from such control and wrong. 
895 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ohio 2008) (quoting Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. 
Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Ohio 1993)).  In order to satisfy the second 
requirement, a plaintiff must show that “egregious wrongs” were committed by the 
shareholders, not just a “straightforward tort.”  Id. at 545.  “Piercing the corporate veil in 
this manner remains a ‘rare exception,’ to be applied only ‘in the case of fraud or certain 
other exceptional circumstances.’”  Id. at 542-43 (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 
538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003)).  Piercing the corporate veil should occur “only in instances of 
extreme shareholder misconduct.”  Id. at 545. 
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Applying this legal standard, the District Court appropriately ruled that although 
McElroy’s complaint does allege a scheme in which FirstEnergy’s bankrupt subsidiaries 
avoided liability through bankruptcy protection, McElroy’s only causes of action are 
negligence and loss of consortium, exactly the types of “straightforward tort[s]” for 
which veil-piercing is not available under Dombroski and Ohio law.  Id.  We agree.  
Indeed, McElroy concedes that “the underlying incident was a straightforward tort.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 11.  Because the allegations that form the bases of McElroy’s 
negligence and loss of consortium claims do not amount to the type of “extreme 
shareholder misconduct” contemplated by Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545, McElroy may 
not pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on FirstEnergy Corporation. 
Finally, the District Court correctly dismissed the remainder of McElroy’s 
complaint.  The District Court ruled that, “[g]iven the failure to pierce the corporate veil,” 
McElroy has “not pleaded any independent basis of liability on the part of” FirstEnergy 
Corporation.  App. 10.  Rather, because “[t]here are no allegations that [FirstEnergy 
Corporation] owns[,] possesses, maintains or controls the premises or had knowledge of 
any dangerous conditions on the property,” id., McElroy had failed to state a claim 
against FirstEnergy.  We agree. 
IV 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
